As a political science student in the mid-1980's, I learned some jargon that journalists use, including the term "alignment". It is jargon that refers to the various electoral coalitions that give one or the other major parties electoral victories. In the wake of the collapse of the New Deal coalition - the first major alignment to receive academic attention - there was a question as to whether the Republicans were winning because of a new alignment or if the country was actually going through a period where party affiliation was waining, what became known as de-alignment. Various facts were offered in defense of one view or another, but it should be clear by now that the Republicans managed to string together a loose (very loose) coalition that included conservative Christians, recently suburbanized new families worried over taxes and property expenses, and corporate interests to provide money in order to govern, not well or effectively but with a certain support from at least a plurality of Americans for a generation. That coalition, owever, has collapsed because of its inherent weakness. We are in the middle of an evolving alignment due to circumstances and changing demographics, and it might be too early to say which party will benefit in the long run, but it is clear the Democratic Party is the early winner in the new alignment sweepstakes.
While it might be convenient for Republicans to blame the war in Iraq, or a lack of concern for "conservative principles" for their electoral loss, it should be clear by now that it was exactly adherence to those principles, plus a lock of concern for the task of governance, that brought about the end of Republican dominance over Congress. The principle weakness stems from an increasing reliance upon a modified version of Nixon's "Southern strategy" - stealing racist white votes in the formerly solidly democratic south throuhg religious and cultural appeals - and the changing interests of suburbanites. There is no more "rust belt", because the deindustrialization of the upper midwest is complete. The demographic and socio-economic shifts accompanying such a change have now reached he point where the earlier concern over taxes and property values are a thing of the past (for the most part). With a shift in the tax burden away from the upper-middle class to the working class, and the resulting increase in economic pressure upon formerly comfortable middle-class families, as well as the growing realization that abdication of serious policy in health care, the environment, race relations, and social welfare have all created a window of opportunity for the Democrats to forge an electoral coalition that can last.
Cultural politics have never been a long-term winner in America (how many elections did William Jennings Bryan win?), and while they have served as a tool for a new identity politics among conservatives, by setting rigid identity lines - you are either with us or with the terrorists, that kind of thing - it has made it easier for people to tell the parties apart and make their electoral decisions accordingly. The results have not been good for Republicans.
There is also the practical matter of governance. The Democrats lost control partly because, as they flailed for an identity in the post-New Deal era, they were bereft of ideas, and simply became practical technocrats. This is not necessarily a bad thing - we always need competent people governing - their chief representative, Michael Dukakis, proved the limits of electablility based upon competence alone. Republicans, however, have shown that competence is not necessarily a bad thing, and that along with competence comes a certain trustworthiness that they have shown themselves lacking.
One more factor that is little discussed is the effect of the end of the Cold War. In his book America in Our Time, British journalist Godfrey Hodgson wrote about the emerging "liberal consensus" in the late-Truman, early-Eisenhower years (called "liberal", even though Hodgson admits it was actually moderately conservative). This consensus held, especially in foreign affairs, although with a certain spill-over into domestic politics, past the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union precisely because the perceived threat was always imminent. There was a certain post-Cold War hangover that allowed neo-conservatives (who first rose to prominence for their strident anti-communism and miltaristic approach to foreign policy) to retain a level of legitimacy in the Clinton years to pose as thoughtful, serious opposition. With the Iraq qar, however, their moral and strategic bankruptcy is quite public. That the Republicans have no other intellectual base shows their coalition is exhausted. They have no one to turn to for new ideas, and are left parading around naked emperors as if they were regally gowned. Blinded by adherence to an ideology no longer relevant, they do not see that they are incompetent seamstresses for an Empire no one wants, and we cannot afford.
These are some of the realities we face in the upcoming years. 2007 and 2008 will show us whether and how well the Democrats recognize the changing realities (the media will not help; they are stuck in a past that no longer exists as far as social analysis is concerned) and if they are clever enough and brave enough to benefit from them. If not, we may be staggering through the next few years bereft of serious political leadership, an evolving set of political coalitions looking for a place to rest their collective heads. Rest assured, however, that one or another party will eventually figure out a way to string together the various groups to create a working, governing majority. My own hope is that the Democrats do so. If the Republicans do it, and do it in a way that benefits the country as a whole, who knows? They may emerge as my favorite party. Only time, and political competence, will tell.
Virtual Tin Cup
