Both Arthur Silber and Glenn Greenwald have thoughtful posts, not so much on the Baker-Hamilton ISG report, but on the assumptions and underlying ideology behind the report, and of course its members who are a who's-who of status quo types who, as Glenn points out with his wonderful ferocity, did not deign to consult a single opponent of the war, but managed to ask questions of Christopher Hitchens (one hopes he was less besotted than usual). Both Greenwald and Silber are highly dubious of the report and its authors, as am I. Both Greenwald and Silber insist that the report is less a revelation from the Wise Ones of Washington (as it has been endlessly hyped by the media) but cover from the same narrow set of assumptions that has brought us this disaster in the first place (I was surprised to hear, on NPR this morning, former Sen. Alan Simpson (R-Troglostan) say that diplomacy with Iraq, Syria, and North Korea should be done as we "talked" with the Soviet Union; of course, the neo-cons were never persuaded that was a good idea, either). As far as the ISG is concerned, I agree with Arthur's quoting from Andrew Bacevich that it is, not only in its make-up, but in its operative assumptions and manner of dispensing its "wisdom", fundamentally anti-democratic. Rather than have a serious debate on the issue, or hearings before a Congress with subpoena power, the first impulse is to create a commission to do the hard job of figuring out policy.
Of course, since the ISG was formed, much has changed. Bush's approval ratings have tanked, staying below forty percent pretty consistently since late-spring/early-summer. Despite a relentless propaganda effort by conservatives and Republicans, and the mainstream media's insistence that Bush is a strong leader to be taken seriously, most Americans view him as a cypher. Finally, the election in November pretty much proved that, even in a Congress gerrymandered to ensure a perpetual Republican Congress, they Republicans couldn't hold on to power. It is this last item that is most important. I believe, contrary to something Arthur writes towards the end of his piece, that elections matter. Here, as counter-point, is Arthur:
[F]ive years from now . . . there will still be approximately 50,000 [American] troops in Iraq. . . . The foreign policy consensus to which our governing elites subscribe knows no party line.
There is a certain truth, at least to the second sentence quoted above, that elite consensus is and has been since the end of the Second World War, by and large, a bi-partisan affair, with disagreement occuring only over particulars. The neo-conservatives are an exception, but their views are, in a way, only an extreme end of what is a conservative "realist" spectrum of opinion (a good book to read on this point, and it is an old one, is America in Our Time: From World War II to Nixon-What Happened and Why by Godfrey Hodgson).
Having said all that, I believe that Arthur is fundamentally wrong to say that things will not become markedly better as a result of a change of party control of Congress or, should it ahppen in 2008, the Presidency. While I recognize the roots of the elite consensus run deep and wide, and while I also recognize the limited nature of the vision of American foreign policy (and I have some sympathy for the views expressed by Arthur Silber, although I believe his case is weaker than he supposes), as shown by a panel that is willing to interview Tom Friedman but not Jack Murtha, I believe that this past election was fundamentally different from any we have had since 1980, when conservative Republicans and Democrats amanged an electoral coalition that has, by and large, held for the quarter-century that has followed. The fundamental differeces are two - the way information is dispersed; economic and social precariousness of a previously sated middle-class. Social dynamics and the underlying structure - the skeleton, as it were, of the electorate - are an important factor in figuring out how and why people vote. Too much attention is being paid to official Washington, even by those who claim to disdain it and all it stands for, and not enough on the electorate who put those officials in place to begin with.
While I agree with Glenn Greenwald when he states that the among the many reasons not to take the ISG seriously is its refusal to challenge an ideological hammerlock by those who, as time and history have shown again and again, were correct all along, not just in general but in most particulars as well, I disagree that ISG will provide good cover for a Bush Administration willing to change course. I see no willingness on the part of Bush or anyone else in the Administration to either admit error or change the fundamental nature of their policy in Iraq. The ISG itself offers no real change, except perhaps for an insistence on more diplomacy, but rather a rhetorical shift, a new way of presenting the situation to the American people and of shaping our reception of it and our responses to it.
The American people, however, united by a disdain for Bush and the Republicans in general, as expressed on November 7, have demanded change, including an end to our occupation in Iraq. Should they fail to address this issue - among a host of other, laudable goals to which they have pledged themselves - the American people will demand action. We have our voice now, and it is called the Internet. Our voices are heard, our power has become substantial. While eiltes poo-poo as irresponsible the idea of troop redeployment (we are told again and again that things will not get better in Iraq if we do so; the American people wisely show they don't really care, and that is hardly the issue anyway) our elected officials must make clear that we will act responsibly, including responsibly towards our military.
I believe this past election was not only a seismic shift in the ideological make-up of the country, but marked a fundamental shift in power, away from traditional centers towards a more diffuse, decentralized, and dispersed - small "d" democratic, in other words - base of power. The elite consensus, as persuasive as it might have been for 60 years, has collapsed, and a new consensus is emerging because the American people are demanding it. I see it all over the Internet. I read it in blogs and various web-sites. I even see it and hear it when I talk with people in church, at work, or wherever. The reason it isn't discussed more is because it is such a threat to the power of the media and those elites who still cling to the old ways. Change has occurred. Elections matter. I do not say this out of some naive conviction, but rather because I have seen it - we all have seen it - in our lifetimes. This time, however, the change has moved in a direction progressives of all shapes and sizes can be happy with. We need to stop acting like losers and start thinking like people who actually have power, influence, and are now, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, winners.
UPDATE: For a persepective similar to my own, go see this (h/t atrios).
