Tomorrow, the Department of Defense (DoD) releases the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which the DoD website calls "a legislatively-mandated review of Department of Defense strategy and priorities." In the preview of QDR, the DoD reports that, along with ending some programs and focusing on developing new technologies and expanding existing ones to deal with future threats, there will also be a focus on the troops and their families. This last is good news, considering that giving military families more money was like pulling teeth during the allegedly "military-friendly" Bush years and Republican control of Congress.
Yet, should one consider a budget more than merely "spending money", but a way to understand priorities and even underlying assumptions, the preamble to last year's budget offers a glimpse in to the thinking behind current military spending. These assumption remain, in essence, unchanged from nearly two-generations of Cold War notions of American military dominance.
For example, the United States currently maintains 10 aircraft carriers and their attendant battle groups. Carriers are platforms for projecting American power outward, in effect extending the borders of the United States to whatever point on the globe they occupy (there are actually eleven carriers in service, but one is only for training purposes). These extremely vulnerable ships - they have a fleet of ships around them including cruisers, destroyers, and submarines not only as offensive platforms, but to protect them as well - while in many ways the pride of the American fleet, are a two-generation-old idea of naval superiority and power projection that look impressive, but create multiple problems. Indeed, the whole question of the need for a Navy is rarely asked; after all, countries have always had navies as an expression of national pride and power.
Behind all of this sits the idea of American military supremacy as a necessary concomitant of American political dominance. Yet, as this handy-dandy website shows (the figures are for FY 2009, but my guess is the incremental change is probably negligible), of total global military spending, the United States alone accounts for nearly half.
Think about that.
There are roughly 220 nation-states in the world (give or take the occasional failed state). Among those include potential adversaries like Iran and China; our allies in the European Union, Australasia, and South America; and potential battle-ground areas such as Pakistan. Even as Iran and China and Russia, even Venezuela, are touted as potential military rivals, one should consider the simple fact that, in 2009, the United States budgeted $711,000,000,000 for the military. China budgeted $122,000,000,000. In other words, for every dollar China spent on their military (including their enormous standing army), the United States spent six. Iran, considered as part of the larger group of Middle Eastern and North African states, accounted for 5% of global military spending. That is to say, it was a fractional part of a fractional part of total global military spending.
What makes these staggering figures even more astounding is the following consideration from the Center for Defense Information (a think tank dedicated to military reform, created by former military personnel):
The articles that newspapers all over the country publish today will be filled with [military spending] numbers to the first decimal point; they will seem precise. Few of them will be accurate; many will be incomplete, some will be both. Worse, few of us will be able to tell what numbers are too high, which are too low, and which are so riddled with gimmicks to make them lose real meaning.
Looked at another way yet, consider this:
Commenting on the earlier data, Chris Hellman, noted that when adjusted for inflation the request for 2007 together with that needed for nuclear weapons the 2007 spending request exceeds the average amount spent by the Pentagon during the Cold War, for a military that is one-third smaller than it was just over a decade ago.
So . . .
Even though the United States currently has American troops in harms way in two regional theaters (the Middle East and South Asia), it seems to me that there is no reason whatsoever that the assumptions behind the defense budget need to be addressed in a fundamental way. Not only for reasons of budgetary sanity, but to reset our entire set of national priorities. Even if we cut our defense spending to 78% of its current dollar amount*, the United States would still account for nearly 40% of global military spending, which would still be twice the amount of the next-largest military-spender - our combined European allies, who account for about 20% of global military spending. We would still maintain overwhelming global military superiority (including such outmoded weapons platforms as aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and ICBMs). We would also be unable to face, in any kind of strategically or even tactically coherent fashion, the current threats from non-state actors (precisely because these aren't exactly military, or completely military, threats).
UPDATE: Here is the QDR in .pdf format. Under the heading, "America's Global Role" (as if such a thing were unquestionable), this just jumped out at me:
America's interests and role in the world require armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our interests and the common good. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale operations over extended distances.
While I have not had time to examine the review in detail, based just on this little snippet, it seems there is little "review" of the far-more fundamental question of the place of military spending within the larger question of the decline of American power and influence, and how a more chastened American nation relates to the rest of the world.
On the other hand, Matt Yglesias reports that, as far as China is concerned, the QDR strikes a realistic, even chastened, tone (at least compared to, say, neocons who continue to insist they are the next big threat to our global interests):
China’s growing presence and influence in regional and global economic and security affairs is one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. In particular, China’s military has begin to develop new roles, missions, and capabilities in support of its growing regional and global interests, which could enable it to play a more substantial and constructive role in international affairs. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role. The United States welcomes the positive benefits that can accrue from greater cooperation. However, lack of transparency and the nature of China’s military development and decision-making process raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond. Our relationship with China must therefore be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interest. The United States and China should sustain open channels of communication to discuss disagreements in ordert o manage and ultimately reduce the risks of conflict that are inherent in any relationshop as broad and complex as that shared by these two nations.
Translation - there is no earthly reason to consider the Chinese a potential strategic adversary, and we have a host of resources to keep our relations with the Chinese on a non-threatening level. In other words, the folks at DoD are much more sanguine about the prospects for our relations with the Chinese. That's a good sign, I suppose.
*I fixed this. My math was stupid, and I realized it sometime last night. Cutting the overall dollar amount to reflect a 10% cut in proportion to total global military expenditures would not be a 10% cut in the expenditures. That's an elementary mistake. It took me longer to find a calculator than to fix this. Sorry.
