What happens when a superpower becomes preoccupied by a costly war and loses some of its ability to coerce friends and enemies toward the outcomes it favors? We're seeing a demonstration of that change now in the Middle East, as Arabs and even Israel reckon with the limits of American power -- and begin to cut their own deals.
The new power dynamic is clear in two developments over the past several weeks -- the Lebanon peace deal brokered by Qatar on May 21 and the Israel-Syria peace talks, with Turkish mediation, that were announced the same day. Both negotiations could help stabilize the region, albeit not on the terms the United States might prefer.
This independence from American tutelage is arguably one advantage of the new diplomacy: It is grounded in realism among the Middle Eastern nations about their own interests, rather than in wishful thinking about what the United States can accomplish. It reflects, as well, the growing strength of Iran and its radical allies, and the diminished clout of the United States -- and in that sense, it accords with the altered balance of power in the area.
The most important line in this excerpt is at the end of the second paragraph: "not on the terms the United States might prefer." Our preferences, including the contradictory ones of continued good relations with the state of Israel as well as with radical fundamentalist nations including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, no longer matter all that much.
Very often we have been warned that in the absence of American power, chaos would ensue, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world. "Nature abhors a vacuum" we are continually warned. Except, of course, chaos too often ensues from our presence, to which the rejoinder that our absence might just be the needed corrective to the mess we leave in our wake might make some kind of sense.
More to the point, it seems that the nations of the Middle East know far more where their own interest lie, and what is necessary for constructing some kind of regional accord, than any outside power whose interests might just conflict with their own. This growing sense of regional identity, as well as the flexing of diplomatic muscle are all to the good. Rather than lament the fact that we didn't get what we wanted, we should be celebrating the fact that such a regional process has been created and is operating with a fair amount of success.
Of course, that won't happen. More than likely, we will do all in our increasingly shrinking supply of power to undermine the deals Ignatius discusses, as well as any others that may come to pass. We are far better at making a mess of things than we are at supporting a process and structure that, while successful, excludes us. As our power dwindles, however, we can at least hope that includes our power to make mischief.
