For The Birds (UPDATE)

When we moved to Plato Center last year, one of the benefits that was apparent pretty quickly was the amount and variety of birds around us. We live on an acre lot, surrounded by trees (rare enough on the Illinois prairie) with a creek on the southern border of our property, all providing a nice habitat for a variety of fauna - raccoons and squirrels, chipmunks and rabbits, foxes and maybe a wild ferret or two. Most of all, though, were the birds. My grandmother, Grace Safford, was a marvelous birder. She knew birds, all kinds of birds, at a glance. She knew their names, their calls, their eating habits, their nesting habits, their migratory habits, their Latin names. She could do the same with flowers (although not the whole Latin thing, I think) but I was always more impressed with her ability to identify birds.

I have always wanted to be able to do the same thing. I can identify a number of birds by their calls - robins and blue jays and cardinals and red-wing blackbirds and cowbirds and the sweet, two-note call of the phoebe. I can identify more by their look, their color and markings. The folks who had lived here before us had a couple bird feeders and a hummingbird feeder out back, and the traffic was lively, but the press of events kept my attention elsewhere.

Late last summer, I encountered, up close, a small owl. I was quite close, no more than three feet away, and it ignored me completely as it went about its hunting, nabbing a mouse or mole in the grass after gliding past me from the branch where it had been sitting. Over the winter, we kept up the seed in the feeders, adding a couple suet feeders for woodpeckers, and all through the long months of cold and snow we had downy woodpeckers, chickadees, mourning doves, and a host of junkos, the last of whom fed exclusively on the ground, which meant tossing quite a bit on the ground.

As spring arrived, we noticed an uptick in interesting birds. First, the red-headed woodpeckers stopped by, for a bit. Once or twice a pileated woodpecker would grace us. The sparrows became thick, regulars at the trough. Then, a couple weeks back, Lisa snapped the following picture.

This is an indigo bunting. I realized that this would provide a marvelous opportunity for me to do something I have always wanted to do - some birding. Over the ensuing couple weeks, I was more careful as I watched the comings and goings of various birds. Then, yesterday morning, I was surprised to see, big as life and clear as day, an oriole. I quickly grabbed the camera and took a couple pictures.

Over the course of the day yesterday, I took several more pictures, including one of a goldfinch. Now, the goldfinches have been hanging around for about a month or so. They are frequent flyers, as it were, and we have quite a few; earlier this week I counted five individuals, three males and two females, perched in various places on and around our feeders. Every time I would grab the camera, they would fly away. I started to get paranoid about them, but I finally snapped a quick shot of a male.

Yesterday morning also saw a grossbeak making an appearance.

I decided, after that, to keep the camera close to the windows facing on the feeders. I also took some shots of some other visitors to Chez Kruse-Safford Aviary Restaurant and Lounge. A white-throated sparrow.

A cowbird, which no one seems to like, but they are an integral part of the community of birds that keep our bird-feeder area lively.

A purple finch, who isn't actually purple, kind of like the red-bud tree down south whose buds aren't actually red.

One of our long-time regulars, a downy woodpecker. I should name it Norm, after the character on Cheers.

Over the coming weeks and months, I'm going to be snapping more photos of more and different birds, teaching myself to identify them, then familiarize myself with the individuals who hang out here. My ultimate goal is to snap a picture of a hummingbird. We have had one come around to our hummingbird feeder, but I've been too nervous to even try to take a picture. I am going to try, though.

Being here is a great opportunity to indulge in a hobby that is fun, adds some beauty and life to our lives here, connects me to the local wildlife, and is something I have always wanted to do. I am learning something new, which is always a new thing, but also something I have always wanted to do and connects me to my grandmother in a way I think she would have appreciated.

I know this has nothing to do with being a Christian, or politics, or much of anything else. Self-indulgence, usually, should be avoided, but the birds are far too beautiful not to share.

Even the cowbird.

UPDATE: The picture below was taken less than five minutes ago, at an oriole feeder my wife set up. Just . . . wow, how beautiful are these guys?

Story Telling

One of the advantages of the "National Strategic Narrative" is the offer to the general public of a departure point for thinking in new ways about how we as a country move forward, seeing the interconnections among not only the various interests of other nation-states, but the convergence among domestic and foreign concerns here in the United States. Thinking creatively includes thinking honestly. An honest narrative includes unpleasant realities as well as more pleasant ones.

One of the premises of the author of the introduction to this article, Ann-Marie Slaughter, is the relevance of George Kennan's famous "X" article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", and the larger emerging policy of containment that emerged with the acceptance of NSC 68 as the groundwork for our foreign, and to some extent our domestic, policy in the Cold War. This is an important historical narrative, to be sure, but it is not without its critics.

One of the most prominent and controversial such critics is linguist and author Noam Chomsky. In the long (60 pages!) Introduction to his essay collection, Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Go There, as well as the first essays that serve as chapters positioning his own criticisms, Chomsky takes a far different view of American foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War, setting NSC 68 within a far different context (and includes some critical comments from, among others, George Kennan, who was a critic of the kind of militarized, ideological approach to our relations with the Soviets; while Kennan sat on the committee that drafted NSC 68, he made abundantly clear in ensuing years that his original article, and policy preferences, were political and diplomatic rather than militarized) and viewing American policy in a far different light than the mainstream view.

The work in question is, in many ways, a historical document, like most of Chomsky's published works on American foreign policy. Published in 1982, the essays by and large cover matters in the first half of the Cold War, with a particular emphasis on events in the 1970's and the emerging Reagan Administration policies in the early 1980's. The Introduction begins by noting that, by the mid-1970's, it was the general consensus among policy planners and informed commentators that what had been a period of American hegemony in world affairs was over; the challenge, it seemed, was adapting to certain new realities, including a more independent Western European policy toward the Eastern bloc, the rise of Japan as an economic power, and the implications of emerging nations in what continues to be called the Third World. Some, at least, of both the Carter Administration and most of the Reagan Administration can only be understood as a reaction against this reality, a denial of the fact that the US, while still extremely influential, was far less imposing on the world stage than it had been.

A significant part of Chomsky's take on the growth and development of post-WWII American foreign policy lies in the significance he grants to a series of memoranda produced by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Produced by the War and Peace Studies Project, Chomsky writes the following, quoting directly from the memoranda in question, on pp. 96-97:

These memoranda deal with the "requirement[s] of the United States in a world in which it proposes to hold unquestioned power," foremost among the being "the rapid fulfillment of a program of complete rearmament" (1940). In the early years of the war it was assumed that part of the world might be controlled by Germany. Therefore, the major task was to develop "an integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy for the United States within the non-German world,' including plans "to secure the limitation of any exercise of sovereignty by foreign nations that constitutes a threat to the world area essential for the security and economic prosperity of the United States an the Western Hemisphere." . . .

The Us.S.-lef non-German bloc was entitled the "Grand Area" in the CFR discussion. Actually, a Us.S.-dominated Grand Area was only a second-best alternative. It was explained in June 1941 that "the Grand Area is not regarded by the Group as more desirable than a world economy, nor as entirely satsifactory substitute." The Grand Area was seen as a nucleus or model that could be extended, optimally, to a global economy. It was soon recognized that with the coming defeat of Nazi Germany, at least Western Europe could be integrated into the Grand Area. Participants in the CFR discussions recognized that "the British Empire as it existed in the past will never reappear and . . .the United State may have to take its place." One stated frankly that the United States "must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after hits war which will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting perhaps to a pax-Americana."Another argued that the concept of United States security interests must be enlarged to incorporate areas "strategically necessary for world control." It is a pervasive theme that international trade and investment are closely related to the economic health of the United States, as is access to the resources of the Grand Area, which must be so organized as to guarantee the health and structure of the American economy, its internal structure unmodified.

One caveat that needs to be kept in mind is the limit of the effectiveness of a series of memoranda in a private organization upon the public policy of the United States. A bunch of really smart people sitting around skylarking about the possibilities of certain post-war contingencies are not a policy, or even a proposal. They are little more than exercises in intellectual imagination.

All the same, there are elements, in particular from the sections quoted by Chomsky, that should sound familiar to anyone who has followed these matters. Even if made more crude and/or circumscribed by a combination of events and political realities, the ideas set forth at least a plausible alternative narrative structure for understanding American foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War. Chomsky's previous, and subsequent, alternate narrative of the history of events up that time relies at least as much on the consideration of this alternative as simple criticism for the sake of criticism.

I should say, for emphasis, that the implementation of NSC 68, rooted in a loose interpretation of Kennan's ideas on containment as well as other criteria (not least an odd combination, as Chomsky himself notes, of the belief in the potential overwhelming power of the Soviet Union and its inherent weaknesses that, exploited enough, would create conditions for its collapse, an eventuality that took half a century) was the official, if classified, statement of our foreign - and to a certain extent our domestic - policy, at the very least until the end of the Vietnam War. I do not know anyone, least of all Noam Chomsky, who would argue otherwise. The point at issue here is the larger context within which such a policy was adopted, the mindset and assumptions of the policy planners in question as well as their sources. The imposition of American hegemony, rooted in a view of American interests being in some sense global, entailing a radical shift in our diplomacy, our military policy, and our economy, was relatively rapid. At the very least, many in the foreign policy community continue to view American interests as global; consider Henry Kissinger's idea that, while certainly emerging as formidable powers, China, India, Russia, and the European Union do not have the same scope of interests as the United States. He makes this argument as if it were a fact, rather than a position in need of support.

The emerging idea that we need a new strategic narrative if we are going to be a credible partner in world affairs, no longer managing but perhaps creating conditions for interdependent action must also take in to account the past, and possible alternative interpretations of that past. While Chomsky does not enjoy a large audience, and certainly not a friendly one, his views do offer an alternate narrative of the past that one should consider moving forward.

Depressed

Before we turn to specifics from "A National Strategic Narrative", I think a few words need to be said about the premises from which Mr. Y works. Any thoughtful assessment of our current historical moment should be realistic not only about the challenges we face as a country, but the social, cultural, and political conditions that color our perceptions of these challenges. The best policy in the world may well sit on a shelf, never to be implemented because the conditions for carrying it out simply don't exist. While the "Y" article certainly takes several steps in the right direction, the authors do not address specifics regarding our current national mood, except perhaps in passing.

I think the best entry point for such a discussion is the national reaction to the news that American Special Forces operatives killed Osama Bin Laden on Sunday. After many long years, including many when it seemed such an event would never occur, the news caused widespread expressions of jubilation and even public celebrations. Some of them have been quite ugly, to be honest. I know that, given the opportunity, such an eventuality was inevitable, determined by the actions Bin Laden set in motion years ago. His death, however justified and justifiable, is not an occasion for celebration in and for itself; even less should it be an excuse for outpourings of hatred.

For several years, our nation has found itself floundering. The past ten years have provided a legacy that has left us, by and large, without any sense that we can extricate ourselves from the hole we have dug for ourselves. The economy continues to be a pile of crap, to be blunt. Overseas, the Arab spring gives even more evidence of the irrelevance of the arguments once made for our presence in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the 100,000 plus troops seem to serve no purpose or strategic objective; while our service personnel face danger and death, there just seems to be no purpose, no rhyme or reason to it, and the upheavals in the Muslim world make clear our presence does little to effect the dynamics going on. At the very least, the successful execution of the operation in Abbottobad, Pakistan give us a reason to celebrate our military, a successful mission accomplished. In that respect, at least, the outpouring of national celebration seems understandable, even if slightly grotesque.

We have something to celebrate. It is a victory of sorts in a struggle that has been long and complicated, includes the horrific events of 2001 and the frustrations of a lost opportunity - I am quite sure through no fault of anyone, just circumstances - in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan that have come to be known as the Battle of Tora Bora. While we achieved initial success in ousting Saddam Hussein from Iraq, the questions as to why do so in the first place, as well as our long occupation, have created bitterness at home and abroad. The spectacle of a stubborn economic slump in the midst of what its supporters insist is a war equivalent in importance to the Second World War raises a host of other questions that just don't receive any proper response. Our various approaches to public matters of grave import just don't seem coordinated; the effects of our actions seem to fade in the distance, if they ever come at all. While we can rest easier with the death of Osama Bin Laden, the underlying troubles and sense of helplessness remain.

For me, this is part of the importance of the "Y" article. In moving beyond the stale rhetoric of the past, it cuts across any narrowly-understood ideological or partisan divide and offers a way of thinking about public policy that, rather than a hodge-podge of base, narrow policy preferences and intermediate improvisations that seem to do little than attempt to patch a hole here or there without addressing the core set of problems we face. In particular with the death of Bin Laden, we can now face the present, and create a possible future, with this particular bit of nasty business out of the way.

Our on-going national funk creates a whole set of obstacles even to hearing what "Y" is offering as a vision for a vibrant, productive future with the U.S. as an important partner with others for making our world more livable, more safe for more people. We need to understand this particular set of obstacles in order to overcome them, so that we can all start moving forward together.

Make 'Em Laugh

The seriousness of pop and rock is something that needs to be punctured. Not only should music be fun, it should rarely take itself so seriously as to be unafraid to laugh at itself. Fee Waybill's parody of David Bowie/Gary Glitter looks an awful lot like Marilyn Manson, who no one would ever accuse of taking himself lightly.

George Clinton managed simultaneously to create some of the best funk, take tremendous amounts of drugs, and produce stage shows so over-the-top that everyone involved knew his acid-flaked tongue was firmly in his cheek.



While Barenaked Ladies have managed to have some fun, the groups that consistently employ a sense of humor in their music are few and far-between. While punk in Britain was popular in part because it seemed to puncture the pretentiousness of the huge supergroups then dominating radio - Led Zepelin, Pink Floyd, Yes - they did it with a self-conscious seriousness that is surprising (except for the Sex Pistols, who had John Lydon out front; he was angry, and wanted to be heard, but he also, at least at first, seemed to be having fun). It would be nice if there were more performers out there who had the kind of humor and sense of playfulness that could create the following anti-love-song. God rest Frank Zappa's soul.



Down to business, what do you say?
Waiting Phase Two - Porcupine Tree
Sparks of the Tempest - Kansas
Mein Teil (Live) - Rammstein
Un Da Sie Ihn Verspottet Hatten (St. Matthews Passion) - Johann Sebastian Bach
Undertow - David Hentschel (Genesis Tribute album)
Prelude - Tangent
Where Did Our Love Go - The Supremes
Help Me - Joni Mitchell
To Say Goodbye, Part II: On Our Way - Ice Age
Leftovers - Sieges Even

The little-known German band Sieges Even deserves a wider audience. I fell in love with their Learning to Navigate by the Stars release, and just love their sound.

Credit Changes In Muslim World Over Past Decade For Leading To Bin Laden

When twenty volunteers signed on to fly four planes in to targets in the United States, the world was a very different place. The biggest difference was that the powerlessness of so much of the frustrated lower-middle classes of various Muslim states was directed not at the regimes that held them down, but outward at targets - Israel and the United States in particular - that seemed not only to represent the ultimate source of their own frustrated ambitions, but provided possible alternative targets for their rage. With vast networks of internal security and long histories of repression, countries like Algeria, Egypt, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and others provided little outlet for their citizens to protest their treatment. They did, however, provide alternatives, in the policies of Israel and the United States that, they were assured over and over again, were the real source of their frustrations.

The situation just this year is fundamentally different and can be summed up in two words - Tunisia; Egypt. The on-going anti-authoritarian struggles across the Muslim world, and the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have shown the frustrated masses of the Muslim world that change is possible, that they need not settle for the never-ending drudgery of repression and the petty humiliations of local bureaucrats and corrupt soldiers. While I think it misguided, the NATO support of Libyan rebels is showing the Muslim world the West understands their desire for freedom and will support it. While there are still areas where our attitude and policies toward the larger Muslim world could improve, the events of the first third of this year, in and of themselves, represent a sea-change not only in the Muslim world, but in the perception of Muslims around world toward the west in general and the US in particular.

Seen against this background, the calls by Bin Laden and others to continue the struggles against the US no longer have the resonance they once did.

This judgment is not mine alone. I found it here.

On The Death Of Osama Bin Laden (UPDATE; UPDATE II; UPDATE III)

It's taken nearly ten years, hundreds of thousands have died in the meantime, billions of dollars have been spent, our fiscal, foreign, and domestic politics have been radically deformed, but in the meantime, the man who bears responsibility for the deaths of 3000 on September 11, 2001 is dead.

I'm sorry if it displeases folks, but I am not celebrating. The terrorist attacks ten years ago were monstrous; what happened as a result is nothing more or less than the erosion of our republican values, the poisoning of our public discourse, and the militarization of our foreign police. We made of a man filled with hatred and rage much more than he ever was. While he certainly gave a face and a name to the forces that murdered so many in New York and Washington, he was in the end just one man.

His death may or may not result in a spike in attempts at terrorism against the US, its allies, or interests. At this point, Al Qaeda is so weakened that it is difficult to imagine it mounting a serious attack. All the same, the cycle of death continues. It didn't start with September 11, 2001, and it isn't going to end with Bin Laden's death. So many have already died, so many families torn apart, so much destruction.

UPDATE: According to Tyler Cowen, there is a possibility that the information that led, in the end, to American Special Forces landing by helicopter inside a gated community outside Islamabad, came about through Guantanamo Bay prisoners and our treatments of them.

I have never been pro-Guantánamo, or for that matter pro-torture (and do note the caveats above), but I am willing to report results which may run counter to my views. The moral and the practical do not always coincide, and perhaps we should be celebrating just a bit less. It is possible this is not a totally “clean” victory on our part.

From a Ha'aretz story:

The initial lead which led to his assassination came out of interrogations of Guantanamo inmates – interrogations which often used torture, a fact that has been condemned by human rights groups. One of these interrogations, of top al-Qaida operative who was close to Khaled Shiekh Muhammad, was helpful in indentifying some of bin Laden's closest aides. U.S. intelligence caught up to them and put them under surveillance.

According to TPM, one of those couriers made a phone call. Bad move.

According to U.S. officials, a crucial moment in the hunt for Osama bin Laden came when one of the terrorist leader's couriers held a telephone conversation with someone who was being monitored by U.S. intelligence.

About the original lead being a possible result of torture and illegal detention, Kevin Drum writes:

[I]f the reason you oppose torture is because torture doesn't work, then you'd better be prepared to change your mind if it turns out that torture does work. I'm not willing to do that.

The obvious counterfactual here is that although torture might have produced actionable information that eventually helped locate bin Laden, perhaps we could have gotten the same information another way. And maybe so. But I doubt that this kind of abstract argument has much impact on most people. The fact is that torture probably does work in some cases, and if you oppose it, you need to oppose it even so.

We have no idea, definitively, whether or not the original lead was obtained through "torture", although if the Ha'aretz story is correct, it certainly seems possible.

This does not, in any way, show that "torture works sometimes". As many of Drum's commenters point out, how many folks were tortured and gave all sorts of information that turned out to be false? You would have to torture a whole lot of folks to get actionable information.

As to one or two folks I've read on my FB news feed who are saying they are glad Khalid Sheik Mohammed was tortured, and that had anything at all to do with the death of Bin Laden, all I can say is I wish some people had a bit more shame.

UPDATE II: Maybe all the torture pimping was a tad premature:

[T]here is currently no evidence to suggest that the detainees that provided the information that led to bin Laden were subject to torture. And Bush Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who presumably has some knowledge about what went on at Gitmo, today threw some cold water on this theory:

“The United States Department of Defense did not do waterboarding for interrogation purposes to anyone. It is true that some information that came from normal interrogation approaches at Guantanamo did lead to information that was beneficial in this instance. But it was not harsh treatment and it was not waterboarding.”

UPDATE III: I feel like Glenn Greenwald here. Anyway, this comment at Crooked Timber sums up exactly the way I feel.

That a mass murderer has met his just reward is good news. But a great patriotic victory, it ain’t. Over at Talking Points Memo, they’re calling it VBL Day without any apparent irony, but this is a far, far cry from finding Hitler dead in his bunker as the Allies take Berlin. Really, even if recent events have definitively ended the prospects for Bin Laden’s insane vision of a new Caliphate, he got a big part of what he wanted as the United States flailed uselessly across the ME and Central Asia, incurring thousands of casualties and inflicting close to a million of them and squandering more than a trillion dollars all the while. As a strategic and/or moral victory for the U.S., this rings very hollow indeed. So good news that a mass murder is dead, to be sure, but all this good news does for me is call to mind all the pointless suffering that the U.S. created on the way to this so called victory.

Democratic Legitimacy And Policy Choices

On a link I put on Facebook to one of my recent blog posts on the Mr. Y article, I lamented the lack of attention it was receiving. One commenter said that it was, indeed, receiving attention, but only within the bureaucracy, which is where such attention belongs.

No.

Doing some quick checking on the historical background to NSC 68 yesterday, I was flipping through the relevant passages in Dean Acheson's memoirs, Present at the Creation. I was struck by the following passage on p. 377:

The need to tell the country how we saw the situation created by the Soviet Union and the necessary response to it came soon after the President's announcement of his hydrogen bomb decision.

Even as a group met within the White House to hammer out the outlines of a policy that would remain secret until 1974, there was a sense that it still required democratic legitimacy. Acheson not only writes of the split within the Democratic Party at the time, between liberals who continued to insist that a negotiated settlement of differences and tensions between the US and Stalin's USSR was possible and those, including Acheson, who saw the Soviets as a threat to be managed and contained (George Kennan was among those on the committee that drew up NSC 68).

In his Voltaire's Bastards, John Ralston Saul levels a stinging critique at what has become a most troubling trend in our public life - reliance on expertise. From p. 477:

[The] obsession with expertise is such that the discussion of public affairs on a reasonable level s now almost impossible. If an engineer who builds bridges doesn't want interference from outside his domain, and a nuclear engineer feels the same about his responsibilities, then neither is likely to question the other's judgment. They know precisely how questions from any nonexpert would be treated by an expert - the same way they themselves would.

Their standard procedure when faced by outside questioning is to avoid answering and instead to discourage, even to frighten off the questioner, by implying that he is uninformed, inaccuare, superficial, and invariably, oeverexcited. If the questioner has some hierarchical power, the expert may feel obliged to answer with greater caer. For example, he may release a minimum amount of information in heavey dialect and accompany it with apologies for the complexity, thus suggesting that the questioner is not competent to udnerstand anything more. . . . And even if someone does manage to penetrate the confusion of material, he will be obliged to argue against the expert in a context of such complexity that the public, to whom he is supposed to be communicating understanding, will quickly lose interest. In other words, by drawing the persisten outside into his box,, the expert will have rendered him powerless.

The contempt for the citizen which all of this self-defense through exclusivity shows is muted by the fact that the expert is himself a citizen. He or she considers it his right to treat his own area of expertise as exclusive territory. That, he believes, is what makes him as individual.

In an intellectual autobiographical sketch in the opening pages of The True and Only Heaven, the late Christopher Lasch writes the following about his growing disdain for post-WWII American liberalism as embodied by the Kennedy Administration, from p. 26:

The writings that gave shape and direction to my thinking in the early sixties . . . contained certain common themes, I now see: the pathology of domination; the growing influence of organizations (economic as well as military) that operate without regard to any rational objectives except their own self-aggrandizement; the powerlessness of individuals in the face of these gigantic agglomerations and the arrogance of those ostensibly in charge of them.

Just as my (small "r") republican sensibilities made me skip the recent royal wedding in Britain (I thought we fought a couple wars so we wouldn't have to put up with things like aristocrats and royalty), so, too, my (small "d") democratic sensibilities incline me to want as great a dissemination of vital, and correct, and comprehensible, information as possible. Turning our public lives over to "experts" is an abrogation of the most basic duty of republican citizenship - being informed and involved. The contempt of elites - bureaucratic, intellectual, and otherwise - for democracy comes in no small part from their own unfounded belief in their expertise granting them exemption from criticism.

Part of my own frustration with the Bush Administration's conduct in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq was the contempt in which it held the public. Not only were a multitude of lies told; not only was the decision for such an act made prior to any justification for it; the entire way the Administration went about trying to influence public opinion was a farcical copy of real democracy. Unlike Acheson, who engaged not only Republican critics on his right, but Democratic critics on his left in order to create a larger consensus for a policy that would be non-partisan, the Bush folks simply tossed story after story, piling innuendo upon lie until, when former Sec. of State Colin Powell sat before the UN Security Council to lay out the American case for war, every single factual claim he made was proved to be false, some within a matter of hours.

The narrative offered by Mr. Y invites participation across a broad-range of talents. Seeing national security in a far broader sweep than simple military, or even military-diplomatic confrontation, but as the whole country pursuing both economic prosperity and stability at home and working with partners around the world in a confluence of interests to work against pending threats to the security of all, including the United States, the national strategic narrative is something more Americans should read and study, discuss and criticize. Far more important than phony budgets; far more visionary yet traditional than any recent "doctrine", be it Carter's, Reagan's, or Bush's, this is a subject that needs to be discussed.

That's why I have been and will continue to write about it. Word needs to get out. It's too important to leave to the experts.

Divertissment

We know [torture] works. It has worked. It's just a lie to say that it has never worked . . .

Some propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people for believing them.

Sam Harris

I noted back in November that Sam Harris has written a book entitled The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. The latest edition of The New York Review of Books has a review.

Harris is aware that such large claims will invite charges of naive scientism, but he is unfazed. In particular, he is well aware that a long intellectual tradition insists that anything resembling a science of morality is impossible: science trades in facts and ethics trades in values and, according to the tradition, facts can never justify values. So Harris’s project will require him to do battle with some deep, and widely shared, views.

The result of all this is not particularly pretty. Part of the problem is that the book suffers from an awkward structure. While the first half of The Moral Landscape is concerned with the possibility of a science of morality, the second half features long chapters on the neurobiology of belief and the delusions of religion (including a lengthy attack on Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health and an evangelical Christian). Harris ties these chapters only loosely to his main thesis. It turns out that some of this later material is more or less imported from Harris’s earlier scientific publications or from Op-Ed pieces or online essays that he’s written. None of this makes for a particularly coherent presentation and the book seems, in places, aimless. By the end, one worries that Harris has lost focus on the ostensible point of his book: that a science of morality is possible.

A large part of the review concerns itself with Harris' curious idea that Hume's distinction between is and ought, that there is no logical connection between statements of fact ("Daniel is my brother.") and statements of value ("I ought to honor my brother."). Orr notes that Harris muddles certain understandings and definitions. For example, at one point Harris writes the following:

If, from the point of view of the brain, believing “the sun is a star” is importantly similar to believing “cruelty is wrong,” how can we say that scientific and ethical judgments have nothing in common?

Orr writes directly:

But of course no one ever said that factual and ethical judgments aren’t “similar” or have “nothing in common.” They’re obviously similar and have much in common. Both are judgments, both are believed by human minds and not by rocks, and so on. The relevant claim is that facts and values are not the same and that statements about facts cannot justify statements about values. It’s hard to see how Harris’s data address this issue.

Quite apart from the philosophical issues, Harris also seems either to misconstrue or be apathetic to what science is, does, and can do, resulting in what Orr calls "naive scientism", which, Orr also says, Harris seems to dismiss by plowing ahead anyway.

Harris' understanding of what constitutes the moral life is simply stated, according to Orr: "It is the well-being of conscious creatures.

Indeed Harris suggests that any other conception of the good either is equivalent to this one or is nonsense: “Concern for well-being (defined as deeply and as inclusively as possible) is the only intelligible basis for morality and values.” After all, every notion of the good ever offered concerns a putatively conscious creature (either our present selves or, in some religious traditions, our future spiritual selves in an afterlife) and it’s hard to see how concern for a conscious creature could involve anything but concern for its well-being. A science of morality must, then, be concerned with what contributes to well-being: a “prosperous civil society,” for instance, or an atmosphere of “beneficence, trust, creativity,” and the pursuit of “wholesome pleasures.”

I'm assuming, then, that torturing and killing conscious creatures who do not share this rather simplistic and vague notion of the good life, then, is pursuing the good for this conscious creature who is befuddled somehow? Or perhaps it is a "wholesome pleasure" to kill people who think and live in ways different from us?

Help me out here.

Orr does say one thing that troubles me.

In the end, it’s odd that one can share so many of Harris’s views and yet find his project largely unsuccessful.

Which of Harris' views does he share? His belief in psychic phenomena such as xenoglossy? His pimping of Hindu deities and Buddhist meditation practices, all the while insisting that "religion" has done nothing good for society, without ever once glancing at the contradiction? His support for torture and the indiscriminate killing of other human beings - conscious creatures, one and all whose well-being is supposed to be the highest morally scientific principle - because they choose to live and think and believe in ways that differ from other people?

I, for one, cannot take much that Sam Harris says seriously. His scientific work may be intriguing, even interesting, although, as Orr notes, even Harris himself notes the promise of neurobiology lies in the future; even the experiments he has conducted and published with colleagues yield far less in the way any "science of morality" than he initially claims. Harris is as much a fundamentalist true-believer as any jihadi, and far more dangerous. Precisely because he seems to speak in a contemporary idiom that resonates, insists his vision is one of expanding human tolerance and the good-life while his opponents are dangerous throwbacks to the age of religious absolutism, his own lack of fellow-feeling, his glib statement that there is factual support for torture when none exist, and the rather blase nature of his idea that killing some people simply because they exist is preferable to living with them; all this give him an air of reasonableness he has neither earned nor demonstrated.

It is sad, really, that so many otherwise intelligent folks have found in Harris' something with which to agree. Taking his published works as a whole, his many public statements and appearances, I find it hard to understand how anyone could possibly consider Harris as someone who grasps "morality" in any manner fashion or form.

Up From Truly Stupid

Our national debt is our biggest national security threat.

Adm. Mike Mullen, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, June, 2010

We are in the midst of a national discussion on the whole question of our national debt, what our fiscal posture should be, and how to prioritize spending in the face of growing strains caused not least by the on-going economic stagnation inhibiting economic growth and keeping revenues low. There are various budget proposals of a more or less serious and mendacious nature, with the plan offered by Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) being the most prominent. The House of Representatives endorsed the plan in a partisan vote, and with House members back in their districts, the plan and those who voted in support of it are being hit pretty hard. This isn't surprising, really. Just as Pres. Obama's policy agenda was the focus of so much constituent angst and anger over the past couple years, so now that the Republicans have control of the legislative agenda, their proposals are large, easy targets.

All the same, the level of discussion, while rising ever so slightly, has been abysmal. There seems to be little coherence to much of the discussion, made even more ridiculous by the adamant opposition of the Republican Party to countenance any serious talk of tax increases. Paul Krugman's simple, clear, and destructive breakdown of the effects of Ryan's proposal is part of the much larger backlash against the kind of policy nonsense Republicans continue to support.

What's needed is not a "plan" that decimates any part of the tattered remnants of the social safety net. Instead, our entire fiscal structure needs to be looked at, as a whole, with the guiding questions being: Who are we as a people? What kind of country do we wish to have? Answering these questions should set our budgetary and fiscal priorities all the time; now, more than ever, we need, in a way, to rip it up and start again.

In this regard, "A National Strategic Narrative" offers itself as a helpful guide for starting, and guiding, such a discussion. As I wrote earlier, Mr. Y sets the whole question of national security within the whole broad context of our domestic and foreign policy, defining security in far broader (and, historically, more accurate) terms than simple physical, national protection from military attack. Indeed, the authors seem to follow on Adm. Mullen's comment, the epigram to this post, that our current fiscal and long-term situation poses a far graver national security threat than any other. To that end, while short on specifics, they envision a set of policy priorities, including defense, that are reset along an axis and against a horizon that sees the United States far less reliant on military defense alone. Indeed, as security is dependent upon economic and fiscal health as big ships and bombs, they call for what they term a National Prosperity and Security Act that would set our national security policy firmly within a larger policy framework of relative fiscal probity and sanity, as well as understanding our military stance as far more flexible than it currently is.

Reading through Mr. Y, I sense a certain reluctance to make some things clear that, if stated (let alone implemented) would drastically alter the entire fiscal and economic outlook we face. First and foremost, ending our military engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya. The maintenance of nearly 50,000 American troops in Iraq is hardly a "withdrawal"; the force is too small to face any possible large-scale military contingency, and large enough to be a constant irritant to Islamic militants across the regions (in particular in a time of political turmoil all over the Muslim world). In Afghanistan, we have over 100,000 troops whose mission, it seems, is to sit there and respond to attacks from various forces, most of whom manage to cross back to Pakistan. Responding by using military RCVs is having a horrible effect on Pakistan in any number of ways, creating an atmosphere diametrically opposed to any perceived interest. Mission creep in Libya continues, and the President's assurance that we won't send American ground forces is hardly reassuring.

Ending these missions and deployments as quickly as feasible would certainly end certain fiscal and budgetary strains, as well as ease political tensions at home. It would also create an opportunity to have a far more serious, far less dangerous discussion on the structure of our military moving forward. While Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has already set out a proposal for cutting $78 billion from the Defense budget, much of the savings would come in the form of future savings, from a draw-down of forces after the 2015 end-date of American deployment in Afghanistan. Other cuts Gates proposed, including the F-35 joint strike fighter, would be, relatively speaking, far smaller.

What is needed, however, as Mr. Y makes clear, is an entire revisioning of our military within a far larger understanding of security. Do we need a 400-ship Navy? Do we need a large strategic bomber force? Do we need a large force of nuclear missile submarines? Part of the reason our defense budget is so large - we spend more on defense than the combination of the next fourteen largest militaries on the planet combined - has been the tradition, outlined in the previous post, of defining American interests and projecting our interests pretty much anywhere on the globe. There was a certain logic to this in 1950. Today, it seems almost absurd, and in tight fiscal times, far less defensible.

None of this is to suggest we should "gut" the US military. Our defense costs would shrink quite a bit, however, if we defined our interests differently, and saw our needs, therefore, within a far different frame of reference.

It is frustrating, to say the least, to be having a "national discussion" of economic and fiscal priorities that is almost wholly divorced from any reasonable and realistic assessment of the challenges and risks we currently face. Mr. Y's proposal for a security narrative, among its many other virtues, offers an opportunity to change the entire nature of such a discussion.

If only any one were paying attention to it.

What A Difference Half A Century Makes

While the anonymous authors of "A National Strategic Narrative" seem to invoke George Kennan's famous "X" article with their "Mr. Y" appellation, a more attentive reader will find much closer parallels with a far different document - National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC 68), signed in to law by Pres. Harry Truman in 1951 as a highly classified Executive Order. Reading through NSC 68 - and it isn't easy; unlike Mr. Y, the piece is long and detailed, rather than sketchy and general - I was struck, in particular, by the perceived strategic posture of the United States on the eve of the Korean War.

In the broadest terms, the ability to perform these tasks requires a build-up of military strength by the United States and its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be superior for at least these tasks, both initially and throughout a war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to match item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our strength, we enlarge upon our technical superiority by an accelerated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States and our allies.

Compared to the perceived strategic posture presented by Mr. Y, this paragraph can be summed up by saying the US needs to be everywhere all the time in force.

A quick analysis of the relevant fiscal outlays and GNP proportions reveals what seems, at first blush, a stark, and threatening, contrast:

The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the disproportion between the potential capabilities of the Soviet and non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V and VI). The Soviet Union is currently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about $65 billion) to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent), much of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these purposes to about 50 percent, or by one-fourth.

The United States is currently devoting about 22 percent of its gross national product ($255 billion in 1949) to military expenditures (6 percent), foreign assistance (2 percent), and investment (14 percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As was pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dollar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that obtained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low military and civilian living standards in the Soviet Union.) In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.

In 1950, Pres. Truman had proposed a military budget of $13 billion. The authors of NSC 68 foresaw the outline of a policy calling for an increase to $50 billion, a nearly four-fold increase. In his memoirs, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, while recognizing that at the time he was writing the document was still classified, covered in broad outline the internal debates as well as the public discussion that followed the submission of the memo, and his own personal and professional opinion that, while a radical shift in national priorities, it was also necessary.

There could be little more stark contrast between the two strategic visions than the fiscal, investment, and even foreign policy assumptions guiding these two documents. From Mr. Y, in contrast to the committee that drafted NSC 68:

Rather than focusing all our attention on specific threats, risks, nations, or organizations, as we have in the past, let us evaluate the trends that will shape tomorrow's strategic ecology, and seek opportunities to credibly influence these to our advantage. Among the trends that are already shaping a "new normal" in our strategic environment are the decline of rural economies, joblessness, the dramatic increase in urbanization, an increasing demand for energy, migration of populations and shifting demographics, the rise of gray and black markets, the phenomenon of extremism and anti-modernism, the effects of global climate change, the spread of pandemics and lack of access to adequate health services, and an increasing dependency on cyber networks.

The closest the authors come to a mention of the boogey man of "Islamic terrorism" is citing "the phenomenon of extremism and anti-modernism". While I would hardly argue that the list is either exhaustive or orderly, that the authors manage to notice economic and social factors before they get to "extremism" (please note, they don't actually say "terrorism", let alone "terror") is telling. The authors recognize that terrorism in whatever form is merely the expression of extreme rage across a broad spectrum of ideologies, knowing no home, respecting no persons. Considering the abundance of domestic terror in the US stemming from anti-abortion and racist groups, one would think this obvious point need not be made.

In any event, against this background, rather than discuss specific fiscal, budgetary, or other outlays in any comparative fashion - precisely because the authors see the strategic challenges facing the US in coming decades coming far less from traditional actors - they do, nevertheless, talk about what our investment priorities should be. The difference with NSC 68 could not be more arresting.

As Americans we have access to a vast array of resources. Perhaps the most important first step we can take, as part of a National Strategy, is to identify which of these resources are renewable and sustainable, and which are finite and diminishing. Whtout doubt, our greatest resourse is America's young people, who will shape and execute the vision needed to take this nation forward into an uncertain future. . . . We must embrace the reality that with opportunity comes challenge, and that retooling our competitiveness requires a commitment and investment in the future.

Inherent in our children is the innovation, drive, and imagination that have made, and will continue to make, this country great. By investing energy, talent, and dollars now in the education and training of young Americans - the scientists, statesmen, industrialists, farmers, inventors, educators, clergy, artists, service members, and parents, of tomorrow - we are truly investing in our ability to successfully compete in, and influence, the strategic environment of the future. Our first investment priority, the, is intellectual capital and a sustainable infrastructure of education, health and social services to provide for the continuing development and growth of America's youth.

Our second investment priority is ensuring the nation's sustainable security - on our own soil and wherever Americans and their interests take them. As has been stated already, American view security in the broader context of freedom and peace of mind. Rather than focusing primarily on defense, the security we seek can only be sustained through a whole of nation approach to our domestic and foreign policies. This requires a different approach to problem solving than we have pursued previously and a hard look at the distribution of our national treasure, For too long, we have underutilized sectors of our government and our citizenry writ large, focusing intensely on defense and protectionism rather than on development and diplomacy.

There are no numbers in Mr. Y, and while this does present some weaknesses to the argument, it also points out a major distinction between the overall strategic picture today in contrast to that of 1950. Then, the threat was, in a sense, traditional. Today, we face a completely different set of challenges, calling for completely rethinking the way we "do" national security.

The Reality Of Adults Versus The Fantasies Of Children

I originally thought a rough overview of "Mr. Y"'s "A National Security Narrative" would be possible. After a few reads-through, however, I cannot possibly do it justice without taking time to linger over various points. I am not suggesting I agree with every detail, or even some of it. Rather, I think a piece of this seriousness, thoughtfulness, and intelligence at the very least deserves to be treated with some respect.

The very first page, indeed, is presented so well, it deserves a few moments to consider what Mr. Y has written. As a summary of the position offered, they write:

The primary approach this Strategic Narrative advocates to achieve sustainable prosperity and security, is through the application of credible influence and strength, the pursuit of fair competition, acknowledgement (sic) of interdependencies (sic) and converging interests, and adaptation to complex, dynamic systems - all bounded by our national values.

This single sentence is a challenge to the view offered by the National Security and Defense strategy of the Bush years.

For an official document of the U.S. government (in accordance with the Goldwater - Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986), the Bush National Security Strategy of 2002 is disturbingly insubstantial, ideological, and, at times, disingenuous. All together, it betrays a remarkably casual attitude toward matters of grave concern to Americans and many people around the globe.

--snip--

Prototypically, a national security strategy is a place to spell out national interests, threats to those interests, and the organization and allocation of national resources to pursue and defend those interests. In neorealist international relations theory nation states are seen a "amoral" units which are expected to pursue their national interests internationally. National cultural values are seen as subordinate components of national interests. What is outstanding in the new national strategy is the notion that American values stand outside of American national interests and that this quality is a distinctive American virtue.

How do these values stand outside American national interests? In the Preface President Bush puts it this way: "These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society..." and represent a "single sustainable model for national success." Later the document says: "...this path is not America's alone. It is open to all." (p. 1) This is an invitation open to all who will follow the path laid out by the United States! It pays no heed to the reality that other states will have different interests. By giving little consideration to the national interests of other states the Bush administration risks being ineffective in the pursuit of U.S. national interests.

--snip--

To the extent that the Bush strategists are attracted to a culture of friendship among select nations their approach seems immature at best. In practice they seem loathe to identify with others or to equate their interests with international interests, while at the same time they explicitly call on their friends to adopt U.S. security interests as their own. These characteristics remind me of the behavior of children in their earliest friendships. At an older age they are characteristics of the phony friendships of a bully.

This criticism, leveled at the release of the 2002 National Security Strategy, sums up far better than I could, the most disturbing legacy of the Bush years, far beyond the failed economy and death and destruction of our wars of choice (which Obama seems eager to continue, despite his campaign promises to the contrary). At the heart of too much discussion of national security strategy is this whole idea that there can be no challenge to American preeminence and power. Any such challenge is not just competition, but a direct challenge to the interests and security of the United States.

Mr. Y, on the other hand, simply removes any such thoughts from how we understand national security strategy moving forward in the 21st century.

America's national strategy in the second half of the last century was anchored in the belief that our global environment is a closed system to be controlled by mankind - through technology, power, and determination - to achieve security and prosperity. From that perspective, anything that challenged our national interests was perceived as a threat or a risk to be managed. For forty years our nation prospered and was kept secure through a strategy of containment [emphasis in original]. That strategy relied on control, deterrence, and the conviction that given the choice, people the world over share our vision for a better tomorrow. America emerged from the Twentieth Century as the most powerful nation on earth. But we failed to recognize that dominance, like fossil fuel, is not a sustainable source of energy. The new century brought with it a reminder that the world, in fact, is a complex, open system - constantly changing. And change brings with it uncertainty. What we really failed to recognize, is that in uncertainty and change, there is opportunity and hope. . . . [emphasis added]

We must recognize that security means more than defense, and sustaining security requires adaptation and evolution, the leverage of converging interests and interdependencies [sic]. To grow we must accept that competitors are not necessarily adversaries, and that a winner does not demand a loser.[emphases in original] We must regain our credibility as a leader among peers, a beacon of hope, rather than an island fortress. It is only by balancing our interests with our principles that we can truly hope to sustain our growth as a nation and to restore our credibility as a world leader.

This is a direct challenge to the view offered during the Bush years that national security rested on a combination of moral and military force, the iron fist in the steel glove. By granting to reality the status of something to be taken seriously, Mr. Y has done policy planners a huge favor. Even if we can quibble over important matters, including whether or not deterrence was, indeed, our national security strategy during the Cold War; to what extent deterrence, as it emerged in the mid-1960's as a wholly nuclear doctrine with the acronym MAD (after flirting with, first, massive retaliation and then flexible response, which foresaw the use of American nuclear weapons in certain contingencies), was a sensible policy given the size and destructive power as well as fragility of the balance between the US and USSR (as well as mental acuity of national leaders on both sides). By making what should be the banal point that the world is a complicated place, and the US is "a" world leader rather than "the" world leader (the difference in article here is almost revolutionary), Mr. Y is offering up as context the simple fact that we are no longer "the superpower".

That's a marvelous place to start any discussion of national security strategy.

Telling A New Story I

If we lived in a more sane land, with a media less obsessed with birth certificates and phony budget plans, the release of a radically new view of American national security policy (.pdf document) would be the source of much discussion, argument, and debate. Alas, since our current moment seems dominated by nonsense - the President is too smart to be President! - the silence around this astounding offer of a vision for moving forward on national security strategy is deafening.

The article is introduced with a brief outline and summary by Anne-Marie Slaughter, identified as Bert G. Kerstetter University Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, who also serves, or has served, as Director of Policy Planning at the State Department since the beginning of the Obama Administration. The summary is succinct, and important in and for itself. Slaughter's context-setting - the authors are identified only as "Mr. Y", as opposed to George Kennan's "X" - makes clear their intention to move past the floundering sterility of the past two decades, in which a post-Cold War United States continued to act as if it were 1947.

There are some points with which I disagree with Ms. Slaughter's framing. She writes the following:

The authors argue that Kennan's strategy of containment was designed for a closed system, in which we assumed that we could control events through deterrence, defense, and dominance of the international system. The 21st century is an open system, in which unpredictable external events/phenomena are constantly disturbing and disrupting the system. In this world control is impossible; the best we can do is to build credible influence - the ability to shape and guide global trends in the direction that serves our values and interests (prosperity and security) within an interdependent strategic ecosystem. In other words, the Us.S. should stop trying to dominate and direct global events. The best we can do is to build our capital so that we can influence events as they arise.

The time when the US dominated events was actually quite short. By the time southeast Asia began to rile with anti-colonial violence, in the 1950's, with a sheen of communist rhetoric, such control should have been understood as gone. Instead, we reacted - as one of Kennan's more important critics, Henry Kissinger, noted was a major flaw in containment; it created conditions wherein the US reacted to an ever-shifting set of conditions, rather than taking the diplomatic initiative - within the already distorted lenses of a militarized containment policy (Kennan always insisted his view was that containment should be a political diplomatic project, rather than military).

In the decades since Vietnam, the number of "unpredictable external events" has skyrocketed. From the rise of OPEC to the stirrings of Islamic radicalism to the growing power of China and India, we have found ourselves facing missed chances and shifting demands upon our energy and resources for which containment was not designed. Any move away from keeping the Soviet threat not just our major but sole national security focus made these events unintelligible, leaving us forming ad hoc responses that, in the end, have left us far more vulnerable than might otherwise have been the case. In many ways, a strategy that grants both the "open" system and that events are going to occur that are unexpected is less a novel approach than granting to an existing reality the status of something we need to recognize.

When during the Bush Administration a national security strategy was developed that insisted the US continue to be the dominant global superpower well in to the 21st century, few people that I can recall called such an announcement nonsensical, practically impossible, and a recipe for fiscal and economic disaster. Now, however, we have a reasoned, articulate proposal for a national security strategy that recognizes the reality we have faced for close to four decades, offering a role for the US that is sustainable, realistic, and in tune with our deepest values.

Tomorrow, an appraisal of Mr. Y.

An Interesting Specimen

The reviews are in. Benjamin Wallace-Wells' profile of Paul Krugman is boffo stuff. Why it has been so well received is captured best by the Salon view of the article.

Maybe it's the paradoxical tone of Wallace-Wells' eloquently articulated elegy for liberalism -- Krugman's got a lot going for him, after all -- Nobel Prize, prominent public intellectual bully pulpit, hugely trafficked blog -- but somehow Wallace-Wells uses the profile to tell a story of defeat: of Obama's failure to deliver true progressive change, and Krugman's failure to get Washington to listen to his liberal "purism."

As I read the article, however, I was struck less by this than by the cliche sketch of Krugman, ever the academic, his mind filled with numbers and books filled with graphs, not engaging human beings in the real world. Some snippets:

Paul Krugman is a lonely man. That he is comfortable in his solitude, that he emphasizes its virtues, that his intelligence gives it a poetic gloss, none of this diminishes the poignancy of his isolation. Krugman grew up an only child and is deeply self-conscious. He will list his shortcomings as though he’d been preparing for the chance: “Loner. Ordinarily shy. Shy with individuals.” He is married but has no children nor—rare for a Nobelist—many protégés. When I asked him if there were any friends of his I could talk to in order to understand him better, he hesitated, then said, “That’s going to be hard.” One colleague at Princeton, where Krugman has taught since 2000, says the economist will avert his eyes when circumstance places the two of them alone in an elevator, his nose stuck in the corner, so as to avoid conversation.

Krugman is short and has a very round, very full belly; he is both generally agreeable and chronically rushed, and this gives him a myopic, distracted air. When he talks about himself, his ideas always arise only from his scholarship, as if once, long ago, he had erected a wall between his immersion in the world and his study of it. At Yale, he says, he formed no impression of the aspiring New York bankers and Washington lawyers who were his peers. Later, though he traveled frequently to Japan and met often with government ministers in the years when the country slipped into its lost decade, he says those meetings did nothing to shape his analysis. He has wondered often about why Larry Summers chose to support a smaller stimulus, but though he and Summers spoke every month or two when Summers was in the White House, Krugman never asked him. “He’s not oblivious to human nature; he will have conversations about this person or that and their motivations,” Wells says. “But he does keep it separate.”

A few years ago, Krugman, having decided that he was going to be writing about politics and so he should know more about it, did a very Krugman thing. He didn’t talk to people who worked in Washington. Instead, he started to read the political-science literature. Krugman had never understood the press coverage of politics, which seemed to emphasize its most irrelevant aspects. Why dwell on a presidential candidate’s psychology when the trends in unemployment would tell you who would win an election? But viewed through the prism of political science, politics began to seem much more familiar to him. There was a mathematics to it—you could assemble data, draw correlations, understand what was essential and what was noise. The underlying shape of politics came sweeping into view: If you arranged members of Congress from left to right based on how they voted on welfare-state issues—Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance—it turned out that this left-to-right axis could predict every other vote: On Iraq expenditures, on abortion, whatever. “When you realize the fundamental divide in U.S. politics is just this one-­dimensional thing, and that is how you feel about the welfare state,” Krugman says, “that changes things.”

It seems to me that Krugman is far less interested in himself, either as a person (let alone a personality), and far more interested in whether or not the information he provides is factual, and his ideological framing honest. Unlike Wallace-Wells' description of Rush Limbaugh as "authentic", which is a pose, a fake personality, Krugman's transparency, preferring readers take in the information, says much about the approach to politics that has reigned for the past generation.

The anecdote concerning the differences between Larry Summers and Krugman when they worked together in the Reagan Administration is key, I think. Summers was a consensus builder, working to bring together people around positions that seemed workable. Krugman, on the other hand, was far less interested in being a player. He was, and continues to be, far more interested in being right. That, more so than whether or not he makes eye-contact with a colleague in an elevator, is far more telling of who Krugman is and what he does.

The portrait that emerges in Wallace-Wells article is, with its mixture of cliche and almost disdainful piquancy at Krugman's audacity to believe that he might well be intelligent, portrays the Princeton Nobel laureate as some odd species of insect - a deeply thoughtful, intellectual individual who is also passionate that our politics no longer be one long exercise in public mendacity. There is an odd combination of arch disdain and anti-intellectualism at work in this profile I find deeply troubling. That someone who is intelligent, passionate, learned, might actually have a better grasp of what is going on than colleagues with similar backgrounds who work in the corridors of power is something Wallace-Wells simply refuses to grant. After all, Paul Krugman can draw a graph really well. That is odd, isn't it.

Nattering Nabobs Or Chicago Billy Clubs?

Rick Perlstein's Mother Jones piece on lying in politics is exceptionally good. It echoes certain themes from Eric Alterman's What Liberal Media?, in particular what Alterman calls "playing the refs", going after the media itself in order to intimidate it. This tactic, which usually doesn't work in legitimate sports, is something one sees in professional wrestling - "sports entertainment" - all the time.

In a remarkable overview of the decline and fall of the United States in the post-WWII era, British journalist Godfrey Hodgson spends quite a bit of time talking about Agnew's "nattering nabobs" speech, and the larger picture of the news media in the late-1960's to early 1970's, and has an awful lot to say about the way the editorial positions of the three networks in particular shifted after 1968. Hodgson makes it clear, in his America In Our Time, that the pivot wasn't Agnew's speech. It was the Democratic National Convention of 1968.

After reviewing the events in Chicago, including the police attacking and even seeming to target the media, Hodgson cites an important fact and quotes a column by Joseph Kraft to show that, even before Nixon was elected, the theme of a liberal media was already taking shape. First, in the immediate aftermath of the Democratic Convention, the major news outlets expressed shock and rage at the behavior of the Chicago police department. Yet, even then, no less than Walter Cronkite conducted an interview that Hodgson notes showed the revered CBS anchor "obsequious" before the bully-boss of our Second City. It seems the actions of the Chicago police were a bit less unpopular than many people thought. From pp. 373-374:

The Chicago convention, in fact, was traumatic for the media. Not only the reporters, for once, but a good proportion of the publishers and executives and editors, too, had seen what happened. The instant reaction, angry condemnation of the police, was from the heart. But then came the disorienting experience of discovering that, in this reaction, they were in a minority. They felt proud of the courageous way they had done their job: and, to their amazement, thousands of abusive letters poured in from their readers and viewers, denouncing the way they had done that job and commending their enemies. "We got thousands of call," Bill Small, Washington bureau chief of CBS remember, "from people saying they didn't believe their eyes, accusing us of hiring cops to beat up kids. That produced a profound impression." . . .

Abruptly, the mood in the media changed from righteous indignation to self-doubt, apology and even penitence. Less than three weeks after the convention the Washington Post was half-apologizing for police brutality with the remarkable argument that "of course" policemen must be expected to be annoyed by the sight of men in beards!

Even before that, however, within a week of the convention, Joseph Kraft wrote a column that, in many ways, set forth the themes we continue to live with to this day in any discussion of the media, themes Vice President Agnew was to sound with fake righteous fury in just a couple years.

Most of us in what is called the communications field are not rooted in the great mass of ordinary Americans - in Middle America. And the result shows up not merely in occasional epidosed such as the Chicago violence but more importnatly in the systematic bias towards young people, minority groups, and the kind of presidential candidates who appeal to them.

To get a feel of this bias it is first necessary to understand the antagonism that divides the white middle class of this country. On the one hand there are highly educated upper-income whites sure of themselves and brimming with ideas for doing things differently. On the other hand, there is Middle America, the large majority of low-income whites, traditional in their values and on the defensive against innovators.

The most important organs of press and television are, beyond much doubt, dominated by the outlook of the upper-income white. . . .

In the circumstances, it seems to me that those of us in the media need to make a special effort to understand Middle America. Equally it seems wise to exercise a certain caution, a prudent restraint, in pressing a claim for a plenary indulgence to be in all places at all times the agent of the sovereign public.

Hodgson then goes on to note the shifting editorial emphasis on the Vietnam War, away from on-the-ground combat reporting to stories about integrating South Vietnamese forces in to the war. Coverage of anti-war demonstrations dwindled; the huge Moratorium March in 1971, the single largest anti-war demonstration of the period, received barely any notice at all by the major dailies, weeklies, or nightly news shows. In order to atone for their sins, brought down roughly by the Chicago police and rhetorically by Spiro Agnew, the media - a much smaller and far more elite thing then than now - changed.

We are living with the tattered remnants of a mainstream media, beaten up by Chicago cops and brow-beaten by a criminal Vice President, too scared to ask some important questions, to point out that repeated misstatements are in fact lies, and that much of the rhetoric on the right is so far off the charts it should be ignored. No one seems to want to point out the horrid noblesse oblige of Kraft's idea that, somehow, there is this Middle America out there that the media just aren't a part of, yet need to get to know - like some weird anthropological field study - in order to do their job. FOXNews is predicated on this picture of reality. So, too, I'm afraid, are some liberals, like Rachel Maddow and even, at times, Bob Somerby, whose media criticisms I largely agree with, yet who accepts without premise the notion that Americans are too dumb to understand when they are being had.

Having said all this, it is nice to read a historian who understands this isn't a problem that began with birthers, or the anti-Clinton brigades in the 1990's, but stretches back to the very beginnings of Republican political dominance. Like so much else in our political life, it seems to have started when Mayor Daley cheered on his cops when they took off their badges and charged the masses.

Northern Sounds

The Band. Buffalo Springfield. Joni Mitchell. The Guess Who. Gordon Lightfoot. Bachman Turner Overdrive. Frank Marino & Mahogany Rush. Rush. Loverboy. Triumph. April Wine. Saga. Sebastian Bach of Skid Row. Bryan Adams. Shania Twain. Barenaked Ladies. James Labrie of Dream Theater. These and many more musicians and singers and performers have one thing in common. Canada.



When Rush broke through the American AOR market in 1980, there was a brief moment when other Canadian bands seemed hot. Triumph managed an AOR hit that sounded an awful lot like Journey. April Wine tried ripping off King Crimson, then scored their one AOR hit with an early power ballad. All the same, it seemed possible that other Canadian bands could break through, like Saga. Unfortunately, bad timing and bad management killed Saga's chances of making it in the US.



Canada continues to forge its unique path, and we are continually blessed by the sounds from up north. Thank you, land of lacrosse.



And now, from a little closer to home . . .

Heaven and Hell - Black Sabbath
Bright Size Life (Live) - Pat Metheny Trio
Transition - Lunatic Soul
Oboe Concerto in C, Movement 3, Allegretto - Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart
The Castle Hall - Ayreon
Forty Six & 2 - Tool
I Don't Wanna Know (Live) - Indigo Girls
Clear Blue Eyes - Amos Lee
Idiot Wind - Bob Dylan
Blue Light - David Gilmour

No Canadians, alas. So, here's one more.

Shaking In Their Boots

Sometime around a decade or so ago, a pastor in a small midwest town held a community-wide meeting on a grave threat to our children. It wasn't the discovery that there were sexual predators living nearby. It wasn't a scourge of drinking or huffing or smoking dope or even heroin. It wasn't a teacher who took advantage of his position or authority to abuse children in his care.

It was the Harry Potter books.

I wish I was kidding. Even writing this makes me feel stupider. The flier announcing the meeting - which I did not attend because I was afraid all the dumb would infect me - noted the books "celebrated" witchcraft, and even posed the threat of releasing "magic" upon the world. Again, I wish I was kidding.

Part of me wishes I could have taken the person who was holding this meeting by the hand and, very gently and kindly, informed this person that there are no such things as witches. Magic, either, for that matter. Oh, there are folks who call themselves witches, I suppose. There are also people who call themselves the spawn of experiments between humans and aliens. Those latter we refer to mental health professionals.

In all seriousness, there are real dangers in the attitude expressed here. Not only the ridiculous idea that a set of marvelous books are part of some secret agenda by witches and wizards to have their evil ways accepted as normal, with a concomitant explosion of the use of magic. No, the real danger here is the message such an attitude sends - be afraid of everything.

I have often felt the same way about the whole nonsensical creation/evolution non-debate. Ours is a marvelous, strange world, full of oddities and questions that force themselves upon us. Science is a marvelous tool for answering certain questions. That the world is intelligible is itself a mystery that many people have found a source of wonder. The theory of evolution by means of natural selection, in its contemporary, modified form (as distinct from Darwinism; Darwin has no idea of biochemistry, of genes or DNA, as the mechanism of mutation and change) is a wonderful, simple scientific theory, for which abundant evidence abounds across time and species.

The doctrine of creation, on the other hand, has nothing at all to say about these matters. It concerns itself with the God who is the author of the Universe, and the fact that there is something rather than nothing tells us who God is, and that this God is a God who does not will be alone. That God is love, according to 1 John is shown by the simple reality that the Universe, and all that is in it, all its wonders and terrors, exists at all, and continues to exist.

There are millions of well-meaning, sincere believers who find even the idea of evolution a dire threat not only to the existence of the Christian faith, but to Christian social morality as well. That is like arguing that the theory of heat exchange in chemistry, or the inverse square law of gravity is a threat to the American way of life. The one has absolutely nothing to do with the other. Furthermore, are all these sincere, well-meaning believers so afraid of an idea they fully and honestly believe to be misguided that it poses a mortal threat to the faith in the God revealed in Jesus Christ? Really?

The point of this post is not to show that the Harry Potter books are wonderful Christian literature. Rather, it is to point out examples of folks who claim the name "Christian" who seem to have little regard for the strength of the God in whom they claim faith. Of all the thing we need concern ourselves over as Christian parents, the Harry Potter books just don't make the cut. If some folks prefer not to allow their children read these books, well, that's OK. Making a public argument, however, that these books pose a public danger to the faith, not least because of the possibility that children might start trying to learn magic, well, that's another thing entirely.

I realize this may sound like a silly example, but the fact remains our society abounds with silly examples of people who perceive all sorts of mortal threats to the faith. Music. Movies. Television shows. Books. Science. Political and social ideologies. Somehow, a faith that has existed for two-thousand years across Empires and in the midst of chaos, spanning the globe in the languages of the world to bring the One Word of salvation may not survive the onslaught from American popular culture.

Either we live as people of the resurrection, or we don't. We need to stop looking for boogeymen and dark forces around every corner, and live as those who are not afraid, but who will mount up with wings as eagles, who will run and not be weary. If we do this, we can appreciate the marvelous story of Harry, Ron, and Hermione for what it is. We can marvel at the beauty and mystery of God's creation, and that we have been granted the ability to figure out all sorts of things about it, including how it came to be filled with such a marvelous array of strange and wonderful and occasionally dangerous creatures.

We do not have to be afraid anymore. One would think this would be the clearest thing to get out of Easter, the most wonderful thing to be granted by the Spirit, the strength and faith no longer to be afraid.

He Is Risen . . . Sorta . . .

The past couple days I've been pushing my own meditations on the death of Jesus as far as I have felt comfortable, given textual and theological constraints. Today, we find ourselves as that moment, most impossible to believe or even consider possible, that this same dead Jesus is alive. Churches around the world are chanting, "Christ has risen! He is risen, indeed!"

I don't think most churches really believe it, though.

If they did, we wouldn't be facing all the crises we face. If we really believed that Jesus rose from the dead, we wouldn't worry about whether or not there was prayer in public schools. If we really believed that Jesus lives forever, enthroned next to the Father, reigning with him and the Holy Spirit, we wouldn't hear people who call themselves Christian claiming that this same God was being pushed out of our society and culture. If we really believed that we are baptized into the death and resurrection of Jesus, and are, in the words of St. Paul, a new creation, we wouldn't claim that the sole reason for all this nonsense was so that we could go to heaven when we die.

I don't think most churches really believe in the resurrection any more. The churches are scared, worried, concerned. Some people who call themselves Christian think we need to force people who don't think or believe like they do to mouth empty phrases to a god in whom they place no trust. Some Christians think that the real test of faith isn't accepting the embrace of the crucified and risen Jesus, but ensuring that every fetus makes it to term. Some Christians insist that we need to show our love to some people by telling them they are outside the bounds of God's grace because they love differently than other people.

I don't think anyone who really believes that they will meet Jesus in the sky when they die really believes in the resurrection. I, for one, would want nothing to do with a God who went to all this trouble, said all those neat things and did all those marvelous deeds, died that horrible death only to make sure that a bunch of rich white folk didn't have to continue to mingle with undesirables on some cloud or other in some spiritual afterlife. Such a god isn't worth my time.

Either we start to live as people who understand, at least provisionally, that the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead inaugurates the new creation, or we don't. If we don't, no one is going to force them. All the same, I would much prefer if such people wouldn't call themselves Christian, go around talking about God as if they really understood what they were saying, and getting people to give them money. Either we start to live and work in the faith the New Creation has already begun, that everything we thought was right and true is now over and done with, or we admit we really don't believe all that resurrection nonsense, and go about telling everyone how wrong their lives are.

I am quite tired of weak, cowardly, pusillanimous false Christians who don't really believe in the resurrection. If we believed that Jesus was raised from the dead, what in the world, quite literally, are we afraid of? Declining numbers and giving? That some people might point out all the bad stuff folks in the past have done in the name of God? That some people might laugh at such nonsense? Are we children?

I am quite tired of churches more worried about relevance than they are about resurrection. If God wanted us to be popular, we wouldn't have been told that we are going to be persecuted, tortured and killed for professing the God of the risen Christ. If God wanted us to be successful, there wouldn't be all this talk of prison and being despised. If God wanted us to be rational, reasonable folks, we wouldn't need to be reminded, as St. Paul did, that what we preach is foolishness to the wise.

Today we recall the singular event of Jesus rising from the dead. All that has ever been, or will ever be is now changed. We who confess faith in the risen crucified one had better start living out Charles Wesley's words, "Ours the cross, the grace, the skies," or admit we don't believe it, don't want any part of it.